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Introduction 
 
The Harvard School of Public Health has released an extremely important study on the 
coronavirus pandemic in the U.S.1 I will refer to this study as “HS” in the rest of this paper. It is 
the result of simulating, at a county-by-county level, the beds we will need to treat all the 
patients who are hospitalized. The headline: In six months, 99 million people will be 
infected and 21 million people will need 1.3 million beds. This is the fundamental 
challenge we face. As the infection spreads and people get sick, we risk overwhelming our 
healthcare system, threatening patients and healthcare workers alike. Of course, while beds are 
necessary they are not sufficient. We need more healthcare workers and more ventilators. But 
without beds we are nowhere.  
 
This is, after all, why we are practicing social distancing. We want to slow the down the 
infection’s spread, to “flatten the curve” in the current parlance. But as everyone acknowledges, 
if social distancing—with its associated lockdowns—succeeds, we risk bankrupting many small 
businesses that are the backbone of our economy and employ 34% of the workforce. Our living 
standards will be compromised. Failure follows success.  
 
In the following working paper, I want to make a plea for what I am calling a “reverse 
quarantine”—quarantining people who are over 65 (who number 52 million), before they get 
sick. We need to complement this policy with federally funded and locally organized efforts to 
support seniors in place, drawing on the wellsprings of American pragmatism, the capacity to 
respond in emergencies, American volunteerism, and neighbor-to-neighbor assistance. We can’t 
turn quarantine into imprisonment. We must work as hard as we can to create a psychological 
sense of community at a moment when, paradoxically, social distancing is driving us apart. This 
may be utopian, but in the presence of disaster, hope can be motivating.  
 
Why do this? If the elderly stay in place this will both reduce deaths, as seniors are the most 
vulnerable, and reduce the number of people who can transmit the infection. We reduce the 
total burden on the health system. With the burden eased, we can let the virus spread more 
quickly, knowing that we have the hospital beds and equipment to help them. This would 
shorten the economic downturn leading to fewer business bankruptcies. After all, within the 
year, everyone who can be infected will be. The challenge that bedevils and threatens us, 
should we find no resolution, is to match pacing with the requisite supply of beds. In this note I 
provide the data and its analysis to back up this argument, to the best of my ability. I hope the 
latter was up to the task.  
 
This note is organized into six sections. In the first section, I introduce the HS and reproduce 
within the limits of my Excel modeling tools, their projection. In the second, I argue that social 
distancing will in all likelihood fail. We will have few of its benefits and most of its costs. In the 
third, I draw on a long theoretical tradition that connects long bouts of unemployment to 
deaths. I suggest that if social distancing provokes a long economic downturn, between 28,000 
and 68,000 people will die in the years following the crisis. In the fourth, I briefly describe the 
Chinese and South Korean strategies for coping with the crisis. I argue that their successes are 
based on their distinctive culture and politics. We can’t use them here. In the fifth, I use a 
range of data sources, starting with HS, to estimate how many beds are “released” by 
quarantining seniors. I estimate that we can reduce the number of new beds we must build or 
re-purpose by over a million if we quarantine the elderly, decrease the length of stay in non-ICU 
                                               
1 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xAyBFTrlxSsTKQS7IDyr_Ah4JLBYj6_HX6ijKdm4fAY/edit#gid=0 
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beds, and repurpose current hospital beds. This may be an overestimate—a best case 
scenario—but I believe that the estimate is within an order of magnitude correct. In the sixth, I 
outline the rudiments of an American plan for tackling the crisis acknowledging that it may be 
still-born, with so little time left. It combines a war-economy with local initiative. I end with a 
plea that we expand the discourse about the crisis beyond the language and frameworks of the 
public health discipline. We need the voices of engineers, business leaders, economists and 
project managers. If we ever needed a “systems view,” it is now.  
 
 
I. The Harvard study 
 
The bottom line of the Harvard report is as follows. In 120 days, 99 million people will have 
been infected with the virus and 21 million will need to be hospitalized. These numbers are 
based on their “mid-range” scenario in which 40% of the population is infected. I have not seen 
the whole report, just the data released to help with city and county planning. I assume that 
some version of what is called the “logistic growth curve” underlies it. It is the basic conceptual 
tool for modeling the spread of infections. Logistic growth, as the following diagram shows, 
consists of two phases, the first, the exponential phase, is one of rapid acceleration, the second 
is a phrase of deceleration or gradual flattening.  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
Why does the curve flatten? This happens because a process of exponential growth comes up 
against an absolute limit (for example, the number of people in a population who can possibly 
be infected). In addition, as infected people become immune, the number of people who can be 
infected declines, reducing the hosts the virus can attack. It stands to reason that as fewer 
uninfected people remain, the growth curve will flatten.  
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My very rough approximation 
 
I don’t have access to the quality of simulation tools the HS analysts used to predict with 
precision the bed shortage on a county-by-county basis in the U.S. But I used an Excel model to 
create a rough approximation of the Harvard projection of infections.  
 
The CDC reports—as of this writing, it changes daily—that there are about 4,000 people who 
have been infected. To approximate the HS results, I created a logistic curve whose exponential 
growth is about 20% every 1.5 days. The constraint that flattens the curve, is 40% of the U.S. 
population. I also assumed that after 14 days a previously infected person can no longer be a 
host, thus reducing the curve of acceleration by reducing the size of the “infectible” population. 
The result is a curve as show in Figure 1 above. I scaled it so that 1/10,000 is the same as 1. 
This simple simulation “produces” 75 million infections in 95 days. I don’t the know the HS 
underlying parameters and formulas, but I will take my simple model as a rough approximation 
of it.  
 
Figure 2: Growth in number of Infected People 
 
 
 
 
Logistic growth and social distancing 
 
The current response to the looming crisis is to promote isolation and social distance. This 
seems sensible. After all, the less contact, the less infection. But the challenge is two-fold. First, 
when the population of potential hosts is very large, as is the case in the U.S., it takes a long 
time before the limits to growth kick in. Before that happens growth is exponential. Second, we 
should not confuse social distance at the micro level with social distance at the aggregate level. 
Consider why the Chinese succeeded. By locking down entire cities and restricting movements 
to the fullest between them, they created sealed off zones with much smaller populations. 
Under these conditions the virus infected a substantial proportion of the people in the sealed off 
zone in a limited amount of time and once the infection reached its limit—all the people who 
could be infected were—the virus had no more hosts. Each of us may practice rigorous social 
distancing. But if our locales are not sealed off from each other, small leaks from one zone to 
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another means that that the virus still has a host size equal to the U.S. population. Social 
distancing diminishes contact within a locale but it does not seal off one locale from another.  
 
Perhaps this is why HS produced what it appears to me to be a pessimistic picture of the near 
term. As I noted, it predicts that the virus will infect 99 million infected in six months or 82% of 
its hosts. Since the growth is exponential, its growth will be slower in the first few months but 
then will “take off,” a bit after the half-way mark. It is hard not to see this projection as a 
prediction that social distancing will have failed as a containment strategy. It has simply come 
too late.  
 
 
II. Why social distancing will fail  
 
All of us may stand six feet from one another, but realistically, we cannot shut the economy 
down if we wish sustain a modicum of our current living conditions. Someone must deliver our 
food and gas, repair our cars and trucks, pick items in the warehouses, deliver the mail, install 
and repair our computing and networking equipment, construct hospitals facilities, produce 
ventilators, and manage everyone’s beloved Zoom network. The promise that the federal 
government will give people money is an empty one if there is nothing to buy. In fact, this 
policy combined with a downturn will lead to inflation. We have no choice. Millions of people 
must work. Unfortunately, these people will remain “vectors” for the virus, however rigorous 
any of us is in our daily habits of hand-washing.  
 
Consider some numbers. While much attention has been focused on people working from 
home, roughly 75 million people, proverbially called blue collar workers, work outside the home. 
 
Table 1: Blue Collar Occupations 2 (1000’s) 
Out of home Occupations: Non-management occupations  
 
Construction and extraction  8,325 
Installation, maintenance, and repair  4,862 
Production, transportation, and material moving  18,628 
Transportation and material moving  10,063 
Protective services 3,128 
Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance 5,746 
Farming, fishing, and forestry  1,156 
Installation, maintenance, and repair 4,862 
Production  8,565 
Transportation and material moving 10,063 
Total 75,398 
 
This is 38% of the total adult population of the U.S. In addition, there are 64 million managerial 
and professional workers.  
                                               
2 https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18b.htm 
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Now, imagine that 15% all production workers were idled, a great not calamitous recession and 
for every 10 production workers let go, a corresponding 3 professionals/managers are let go. In 
addition imagine that ½ of the employed professionals work from home. 
 
Consider as well another issue. The people who are most frightened by the pandemic are the 
old and infirm. Younger people are less frightened since they are much less likely to have 
weakened immune systems. They will not be able to gather in large numbers in restaurants, but 
they will continue to stay on the street, particularly as the weather improves, to shop in 
supermarkets, to visit hospitals and doctor’s officers as needed, to ride buses and trains, to stay 
at hotels, etc.  
 
If “old” is over 65, then the “non-old” group is about ¾ of the workforce. In addition, they are 
the ones who are more likely to be asymptomatic. Feeling healthy, they are less likely to be 
cautious, particularly as the protocols for social distancing become wearing and the stress of 
idleness, marital discord, the press of unsupervised children, and economic anxiety increases. 
with others can we really expect this policy to be successful?  
 
These assumption are represented in this table.  
 
Table 2: What happens when workers are unemployed: Some assumptions 
 
 
 
We get the following results: 
 
Table 2A. Production worker unemployment rate: 15% 
 
 
 
We get 110 million people who are vectors for the virus, a third of the work force. We might 
suppose that we could reduce the number of “vectors” by drastically cutting back on jobs. 
Consider an unemployment rate for production workers of 50%, a calamitous level more than 
twice the rate of the Great Depression. We get the following:  
 
 
 
 
Pofessional workers in the workforce 64
Production workers in the work force 75
Unemployment rate of production workers 0.15
Unemployment rate of professional workers 0.045
% of  workers less than 65 years 0.75
%o of employed professionals who work at home 0.5
% of people at home who don't practice social distance 0.5
Prof Production
Total in work place 29 64
At home 35 11
Don’t practice SD while at home 13 4
Potential vectors for the virus 42 68 110
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Table 2B: Production workers unemployment rate of 50% 
 
 
 
Even though the unemployment rate has increased more than three-fold, the number of people 
who are potential vectors for the virus fall by only 18%. This is because we are just shifting 
people from the workplace to the home and if younger people are not rigorous in practicing 
social distance they can spread the infection whether at home or at work. 
 
There is a more insidious consequence of social distancing, but it will be soon become 
apparent. We are unraveling the supply chain. This is dangerous when, at the same time, we 
anticipate mobilizing people, money, and resources to meet the challenge of building hospital 
capacity. What happens when people responsible for sourcing supplies and skilled workers 
come up short?  
 
 
III. The health costs of economic distress 
 
We also have to consider the impact of economic distress on health. The virus kills but so can 
severe economic downturns. Two studies are relevant.3 The first, a classic in the field, and 
based on a review of experiences in nine western countries, found that a 1% increase in 
unemployment led to 6,000 extra deaths in the population in a particular year. Of course, 
“frictional” unemployment, when workers move between jobs need not be distressing. What 
counts is the length of the unemployment experience. The average duration of employment in 
the U.S. from 1990 to the present is about 21 weeks or five months. Social distancing will most 
likely induce a recession, and it could be severe because, as I have already noted, many 
businesses, particular the smaller ones, will face a cash crunch and likely bankruptcy. 
Recessions on average last 11 months, longer than the average bout of unemployment. 
 
The following table shows the relationship between downturns and unemployment. 
 
Table 4: Recessions and Unemployment4 
 
 
                                               
3 R L Jin, C P Shah, and T J Svoboda The impact of unemployment on health: a review of the evidence, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1487417/ 
4 https://www.thebalance.com/unemployment-rate-by-year-3305506 
Total in work place 22 38
At home 42 38
Don’t practice SD while at home 16 14
Potential vectors for the virus 38 52 90
Contraction 
in GDP
Unemploym
ent rate
1954 -0.60% 5.0%
1974 -0.50% 7.2%
1975 -0.20% 8.2%
1991 -0.10% 7.3%
2008 -0.10% 7.3%
2009 -2.50% 9.9%
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The rate of unemployment just before the coronavirus crisis was 3.6% If the recession is as 
severe as that which followed the 2008 crash, a 9.9 % unemployment, the contraction should 
produce excess mortality of 6000 x (9.9 - 6.3) = or 37,000 “extra” deaths, just within this year. 
If the recession were more extreme, 15% employment and it lasted for at least a year, we 
would “create” 6,000 x (15 - 3.6) or 68,400 deaths.  
 
Social distancing may compound this empirical link between health and economic hard times. In 
normal times, when despair is shared, people help each other thus mitigating their sense of 
isolation. The shared despair paradoxically can create social cohesion. This experience protects 
health just as unemployment undermines it. For example, in the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
workers and farmers found agency and cohesion in their struggle to form unions and in their 
common fates as they migrated West. Paradoxically, one result of social distancing is social 
isolation and the fear and suspicion that other people are careless in their regard for one’s own 
health, or worse, that they are predators.  
 
These estimates are based on correlating yearly data. We must take account of the “long tail” 
consequences of a major recession or depression. Some detailed clinical studies of particular 
populations allow us to take account of this longer tail in terms of health outcomes. For 
example, one meta-analysis reports5 on two studies of the “standard mortality rate” of 
unemployed men in the U.K. The Standard Mortality Rate (SMR) is the ratio of the observed 
death rate of subjects in a particular study relative to the death rate of similar group in the 
population. So, a rate of 121 represents a 21% increase over the expected rate.  
 
In one study of unemployed men, they suffered a 21% increase mortality relative to their peers 
and in a second study, a 47% increase.  
 
Table 5: Standard Mortality 
 
 
 
We can use these results to calculate the impact of long-term unemployment on the mortality 
of U.S. workers. To do this, consider first the following table. It presents the expected deaths 
per 100,000 men of different ages and the percent that each age group is of the total labor 
force. I used this data to create a weighted average for workers aged 16 to 64 of 403 deaths 
per 100,000 in a given year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5 Op cit, RL Jin 
Age group
Number of 
Men in 
Study
Standard 
Mortality 
Rate 
15-64 5861 121
15-64 14675 147
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Table 6: Deaths per/100,0006 
 
 
 
This number became my expected death for workers in the labor force and I could then apply 
the SMRs to calculate the extra deaths.  
 
Table 7: Extra Deaths due to Unemployment 
 
 
 
So we can expect that there will be an extra 137 deaths per 100,000 people should the 
economic contraction result in a significant recession. There are 78 million men in the labor 
force from the ages of 16 to 64. If we have a contraction with 15% unemployment, then the 
number of expected deaths would be .15 x (78 million/100,000) x 137 = 16,029 extra deaths 
Note that this only applies to men. If women were ¾ as likely to die as men, we would have 
extra deaths of 28,050 deaths  
 
Of course, these are admittedly rough calculations, but I think they point to order of magnitude 
estimates that warrant serious consideration. We are looking at somewhere between an extra 
28,000 to 68,000 deaths should the current contraction and resulting recession prove severe. 
We must consider the mortality risks of a severe recession. They are likely to be substantial and 
they will be hidden, because they will have a longer tail than the deaths associated with the 
virus.  
 
Let’s step back. Here is my pessimistic scenario (as if there is not enough already). Without 
draconian measures that lock down regions and cities, the social distancing strategy will fail in 
about three to four months. Everyone will be on course to be infected. We will unravel the 
                                               
6 https://www.statista.com/statistics/241572/death-rate-by-age-and-sex-in-the-us/ 
Age groups 
(men) 
Deaths per 
100,000
% of  labor 
force
15-19 72.7 3%
20-24 137.9 10%
25-34 154.6 24%
35-44 232 23%
45-54 422 22%
55-64 1124 18%
Weighted 
average 
deaths 403
Age group
Number of 
Men in 
Study
Standard 
Morality 
Rate 
Extra 
deaths per 
100,000
15-64 5861 121 85
15-64 14675 147 189
Average 137
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supply chain we need to build the beds required to treat the sick and fend off deaths. The 
resulting economic depression and social distress will be demoralizing. People will have 
sacrificed living conditions and social connections for nothing. They will experience inflation, the 
first in the living memory of young adults.  
 
Not enough beds, inflation, unemployment, a demoralized population and deaths the virus did 
not cause. Five horses of the apocalypse. This is a dangerous outcome.  
 
 
IV. Two extant strategies  
 
The Chinese and the South Koreans provide us with two distinct strategies for responding to the 
crisis; regional lock downs, and mass testing combined with the surveillance. There is a third,  
which I envision as an American response: The reverse quarantine combined with a new 
“Manhattan project,” the latter, a reference to the project established to build the atomic bomb 
in World War II. I will make an argument for this third alternative. It draws on American can-do 
culture and its volunteer ethos—if indeed we can draw on this reservoir of historical memory 
and experience. My proposal may be too late in the coming months and perhaps is decidedly 
utopian in character. But if I am to remain true to my sense of urgency and contribute to the 
necessary discussion we must have, I feel I have no choice but to offer them. 
 
 
Lock down 
 
The Chinese have clearly been successful with a lock down strategy, increasing the doubling 
time of deaths to 34 days, the days it takes for deaths to double, though there has been some 
slippage since earlier in the week. At the time of this writing, their doubling time was 34, days 
and if my notes are correct, it was once 39. The virus is down but it may not be out. By all 
accounts, they have achieved their success through draconian measures that cannot be 
reproduced elsewhere. As one reporter notes,7 “Thirteen cities, containing more than 60 million 
people have been locked down. Homes have become prisons; life has stopped China has the 
ability to impose these measures better than anyone else on the planet,” As another observer 
noted, “There's no other place that could do what China did to that magnitude and sustain it.”8 
As I noted, lockdowns succeed for one simple reason: they deprive the virus of the large host 
population it needs to spread itself widely. But this means that there can be no leakage 
between locales. Any leakage—a truck driver, a salesperson—creates a vector for carrying the 
virus from one locale to another.  
 
 
Mass testing and surveillance 
 
The South Koreans have succeeded with mass testing and surveillance, driving up their 
doubling days of deaths to 12, though this still represents roughly, a 6% growth rate per day. 
As of March 17, they conducted a total of 274,000 tests and are able to test 20,000 per day. 
They have 50 drive in centers for testing. Testing is matched with surveillance. The government 
mandates that people install GPS tracking devices on their phones and, “Public government 
reports detail the whereabouts of every single confirmed patient—down to which theater seat 
                                               
7 https://www.wired.co.uk/article/coronavirus-uk-response-china 
8 https://www.wired.co.uk/article/coronavirus-uk-response-china 
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they sat in, which plastic surgery clinic they visited and even where they got their lingerie. The 
health and the National Police Agency share the “location information of patients and of persons 
likely to be infected.” 9 With this tracking system the authorities can rapidly “contact-trace” 
hundreds of thousands of its own citizens to curb the outbreak. In addition, as a result of new 
amendments to current laws and regulations, “The government can criminally prosecute 
suspected patients who refuse to get tested for the virus with a fine of up to 3,000,000 KRW 
(~$3,000). The amendment also significantly increases the potential penalty for breaking 
quarantine to up to one year of imprisonment or a fine of 10,000,000 KRW (about $10,000) for 
the offense.” 10 
 
The South Korean experience highlights how testing and surveillance must be combined. 
Testing people helps individuals make informed and thoughtful decisions if they choose to do 
so, for example, to protect others. But without such native consideration, the impact of testing 
on containing the virus is limited. It does not by itself prevent the infection’s spread. It is very 
important for protecting healthcare workers who can screen the patients they care for, but it 
won’t necessarily control the infection’s spread  
 
I understand that these are tintype descriptions. Much more can and will be written on the 
record of these countries’ responses and results. But I highlight them to suggest that there 
should be a fit between a country’s cultural makeup and the measures it uses to combat the 
virus. For example, the South Koreans in their effort, profit from several distinctive cultural 
features: their cultural cohesion and homogeneity, their familiarity and comfort with putting 
themselves on a quasi-war footing—a legacy of the existential threat from the North—the social 
discipline that propelled the country from poverty to wealth in two generations, and from their 
Confucian tradition that values loyalty. 
 
It is also evident that the Chinese Communist Party’s uncontested policer power has helped 
them fight the virus in their country. The party’s cell structure in government, and increasingly 
in private companies—the shadow authority system that regulates and constrains apparent 
authority in all institutions—helps the party direct and coordinate the decisions and choices of 
local and regional governments and ministries. 
 
 
The hospital capacity problem project 
 
What option do we have in the U.S.? First, let’s consider the scale of the problem. The 
presenting challenge, as every expert acknowledges, is that we do not have the hospital beds 
and the associated staff and equipment to care for the people who will be acutely ill. What is 
the size of the gap?  
 
The HS projects a need for 1.3 million beds in the next six months to accommodate roughly 21 
million patients. This means roughly that every bed can “turnover” 21/1.4 or roughly 15 
patients in six months, or 2.5 patients per month. This means roughly a length of stay of .4 
days of a month (1/2.5), or a bit less than two weeks. 
 
                                               
9 https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-america-how-south-korean-authorities-used-law-fight-coronavirus  
10 Ibid 
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The CDC reports11 that seniors (those older than 65), will account for 45% of hospitalizations, 
53% of ICU admissions, and 80% of deaths associated with the virus. In addition, the HS 
projects that 21% of all admissions to the hospital will be to the ICU. We can use this data to 
construct the following table.  
 
Table 8: Admissions of 100 patients 
 
 
 
 
This table begins to give a sense of the resource load on the hospital system that seniors 
constitute. They are 45% of all admits and 52% of all ICU admits.  
 
I can use this data to “reverse engineer” the HS projection, that, on average, a patient will 
spend a bit less than two weeks in the hospital. This number at first seems high but that is 
because it reflects both ICU and regular admissions. Patients in the ICU will stay longer than 
patients in acute care beds. The following table shows the results. (If the reader finds the 
concept of “fractional patients” bothersome, just multiply the patient and patient-day numbers 
by one-hundred, so that “.5” becomes “50” and “2” becomes “200.”)  
 
Table 9: Patients and patient-days per month 
 
 
 
I calculated these numbers in the following way. We know from the HS that each bed turns 
over 15 patients in six months or 2.5 patients per month. This is equivalent to the idea of 
“inventory turns” in business, or the way a restaurant owner thinks of his tables- how many 
dinner parties does it turn over in an evening. Using the data from Table 10 this means that of 
these 2.5 patients, .5 are admitted to the ICU and the rest to regular beds. “Playing with the 
numbers,” I found that if an ICU patient stays a month in the hospital and a regular patient 
stays a week this means arithmetically that the length of stay of the “average” patient will 
be .41 months, (.5+.5/2.5), which matches very closely, the HS data.  
 
 
We just need a few more steps in the calculation. Using the percentages in Table 10 we find 
that:  
 
 
                                               
11 https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6912e2.htm?s_cid=mm6912e2_w 
seniors not seniors
ICU admits 11 10
Regular admits 34 55
Number of 
Patients
Length of 
stay in 
months
Patient-
days
ICU admits 0.5 1.00 0.5
Regular 2.0 0.25 0.5
Total patients 2.5 0.4
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Table 10: Old people admissions per month per bed 
 
 
 
So we can now use Tables 8 and 9 to “subtract” the old people from the 2.5 patients per month 
load on a hospital bed. We can use the results to calculate the new average length of stay and 
patient load per bed.  
 
Table 11: Impact of withdrawing old people on patient days 
 
 
 
Patients have dropped from 2.5 patients per bed per month to 1.4 patients. If originally a bed 
was turning over 2.5 patients and is now turning over 1.4 patients, we need correspondingly 
1.4/2.5 = 56% as many beds. The reason this drop is so large, more than half, is because 
seniors are slightly more than half of all admits and more than half of all ICU admits, the 
admissions that take up more bed-time. Since the HS projection is for 1.3 million beds, the 
number of beds saved comes to roughly (1-.56) x 1.3 million or 572,000 beds. This is a sizeable 
reduction in bed requirements.  
 
Quarantining has two other important benefits. It reduces the demand for ICU beds by almost 
40%, --.2/.5. This has a great impact on the hospital workforce. It also reduces the number of 
deaths. Let’s assume that deaths only occur when a patient in an ICU, does not survive. This 
corresponds roughly to reality. By quarantining old people we prevent 2.5 -.2= 1.7 seniors from 
entering the ICU and occupying a bed every month, or 10.2 patients per bed over the six-
month projection of the HS. Since there are 1.3 million beds that old people would have 
occupied, had they not been quarantined, we prevent 1.3 x 10.2 = 13.26 million seniors from 
occupying ICU beds. Chinese data12 suggests that old people have a mortality rate that ranges 
between 1.5% an 4.7%. If we presume that this range characterize seniors in the ICU, then the 
number of deaths prevented is between 199,00 and 620,000 deaths. If we took the average of 
the two, we get 409,000 lives saved, a very meaningful result.  
 
We can also reduce the load on hospitals by somewhat reducing the average length of stay in 
the non-ICU. I presume this would be easier to accomplish in acute care beds as opposed to 
ICU beds. Let me first look at the numbers. As we have seen, working with the HS data and my 
interpolations of it, by withdrawing seniors from the hospitals we reduce the patients occupying 
a regular bed from 2.0 to 1.1. Let’s assume that we can reduce length of stay from roughly 
seven days, ¼ of a month, to five days, or .167 of a month. We can use the following table to 
calculate how many beds we would save.  
                                               
12 https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/16/lower-coronavirus-death-rate-estimates/ 
Total admits per bed per month 2.5
Senior/ICU 0.28
Senior/regular 0.84
Number of 
Patients
Length of 
stay in 
months
Patient-
days
ICU admits 0.2 1.00 0.2
Regular 1.1 0.25 0.3
Total patients 1.4 0.39
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Table 12: The impact of reducing length of stay 
 
 
 
If 1.1 patients stay for .25 days then the total patient=days a bed supports is .275. if we want a 
bed to continue to be as “productive” and if the length of stay drops from seven days to five, a 
bed can support 1.65 patients as against 1.1 patients. Correspondingly, we would need only 
1.1/1.65 = 2/3 as many beds to support the same number of patients. If the total number of 
beds reduced, after having protected seniors from hospitalization is 728,000 then we would 
save an additional 243,000.  
 
I have some general knowledge on how to reduce length of stay in non-critical care beds, 
based not on any medical expertise, but on my management consulting experience. If that 
experience is relevant to the treatment of this virus, it suggests that hospitals can reduce length 
of stay by applying good practice using standardized protocols and permitting little variation. 
Patient care under these circumstances must be “industrialized.” Whether this is possible under 
the extremes of the urgent situation we currently face is a separate but important question.   
 
Finally, as everyone now recognizes we can save on building new bed capacity by repurposing 
current hospital beds. The Society for Critical Care Medicine reports that that in 2010 there 
were 641,000 total acute care beds, which included 104,000 ICU beds. They note that the 
number of ICU beds grew 17% from 2000 to 2010. Applying this same growth rate to the last 
decade for both acute care and ICU beds we get an estimate of 750,00 beds. 13John Hopkins 
Center for health security suggested that hospitals release 30% of its beds to treat patients 
with the virus. Based on these estimate, this releases 225,000 beds. 14 
 
We can now integrate the results of our different calculations. We can project the following bed 
savings: 
 
Table 13: Summarizing how to save on bed construction 
 
 
The challenge under this scenario looks far less scary and much more doable.  
 
 
                                               
13 https://www.sccm.org/Blog/March-2020/United-States-Resource-Availability-for-COVID-19 
14 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/the_johns_hopkins_hospital_launches_capacity_command_c
enter_to_enhance_hospital_operations 
patients length of stay Patient days
1.1 0.25 0.275
1.65 0.167 0.275
Action Beds 
Withdrawing seniors 572,000
Reducing length of stay 242,667      
Repurposing beds 225,000
New bed construction not required 1,039,667
HS estimates of beds required 1,300,000
New beds required 260,333
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A virtual circle 
 
There are two very important benefits of reducing the load on our bed supply. First, it frees up 
management, planning, workforce, and material resources to produce the ventilators that are 
so essential for good care. Second, and more subtly, the rationale for strict social distancing is 
to pace the rate at which the infection spreads so that the hospital system is not overwhelmed. 
Everyone susceptible to the infection will eventually get it. It is just a question of when. If we 
are at much less risk of overwhelming our hospital system we can then relax the social 
distancing regimen and tolerate a faster spread of the virus. We can move more quickly to 
restore our economy and protect our supply chain, the very chain we need to respond to the 
crisis in the first place. In effect, we could create a virtual circle, where:  
u By protecting seniors, we reduce the load on the hospital system. As a result we can both 
release resources to produce ventilators and to build the extra beds we need more readily.  
u As we do this, we relax social distance measures, which restores the supply chain and 
enables us to build the hospital infrastructure we need. This also reduces the risk of 
business bankruptcy, decreasing the likelihood of a significant recession with its health 
knock-on effects in terms of more deaths later.  
u As the infection spreads more rapidly, the virus “burns itself out” more quickly, at least for 
this season, and we develop population immunity more quickly. We can accommodate 
people who get sick earlier with our more prepared hospital system with the requisite 
number of ventilators and beds. These people will be younger. They are less at risk and will 
require fewer ICU beds and resources.  
u Most importantly we prevent a significant number of deaths of seniors.  
 
The following visual describes the virtuous circle  
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An alternate reality?  
 
One presenting issue is whether or not it is feasible and ethical to quarantine seniors. Some 
seniors could adapt. For example, they can work from home, are retired, and enough money in 
the bank and can rely on the love and attention of children, grandchildren and close relatives. 
Many of these seniors appear to be self-isolating voluntarily. On the other hand, there are 
seniors who can’t readily adapt. They have less money, care for young grandchildren, or live 
alone. The latter number 11 million! 15 Enforced isolation is not far from imprisonment even if it 
is “for your own good!,”  
 
One imaginary response—call it my “alternate reality”—is that the federal government in 
coordination with local governments, charitable and service organizations (such as the Red 
Cross and Meals on Wheels, public libraries, along with block and neighborhood associations) 
could—with the right level of coordination, paid staff, and federal and state money—bring 
resources, help, and succor to seniors who need it. This will reduce the seniors’ sense of 
isolation and enhance their psychological sense of community. Perhaps one way to proceed is 
to mobilize social services for the isolated first, while at the same time providing inducements 
and supports to all other seniors, for example subsidizing home food delivery, waived feeds for 
cable channels, and other such practical measures.  
 
The counterpoint to this argument, or fantasy if you are a skeptic, is two-fold. It is simply too 
late. But this is the peril lurking in the background of the very effort that led me to write this 
working paper. We may have no time left. Our planning has been fitful. We did not respond to 
the early signs of the pandemic in China. President Trump seems reluctant to put us on a true 
war footing through which the federal government could commandeer the resources we need 
to prepare quickly. All these inconvenient truths together may be shouting from the hilltop, 
“Game over!”  
 
The second argument by one dear friend, is that this society is too socially and psychologically 
damaged to imagine that any campaign for protecting strangers, or perhaps even one’s 
relatives is plausible. We simply lack cohesion. Polarization has fatally undermined our good 
will. Another dear friend adds, that while many people respond with vivacity and commitment 
to helping people in natural disasters, the pandemic lacks the visceral qualities of a flood, 
firestorm, or a 9/11 to provoke people to actions. The bias is to self-protect, a bias 
paradoxically reinforced by social distancing—or, alternatively, to throw caution to the wind, 
one response to our failure to respond 
 
 
V. A Manhattan Project 
 
Earlier in this working paper I referenced the “Manhattan Project.” This was the effort that FDR 
instigated at Einstein’s prodding to marshal the greatest American engineering and scientific 
talent to build an atomic bomb before the Nazis did. But I am no Roosevelt, Einstein, or Robert 
Oppenheimer who ably ran the project from its inception to its completion. So let me begin on a 
personal note.  
 
As a child I watched a popular television show called Queen for a Day. It was a 1950s show. A 
few ordinary women would tell a sad story of their life, and the live audience would vote on 
                                               
15 https://www.aplaceformom.com/blog/10-17-14-facts-about-senior-isolation/ 
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whose sad tale was most meritorious. That woman was “Queen for a Day.” She received help 
for her problem—for example, money for her child's surgery, and some gifts that were only 
tangentially related to her tale. I don't know why I was drawn to the show. Perhaps it was my 
mother, a Holocaust survivor had her own very sad tale, and a trauma which haunted her and 
which she could never expunge. Perhaps in responding to the current crisis the trauma of this 
earlier one which I have internalized, provokes the question, “Why did we not see what was 
coming?”  
 
So, if I were “Queen for a Day” I would do the following:  
u Put the country on a war-footing. Create a war-production board to organize the widest 
features of the required response to the crisis.  
u Announce a quarantine of all seniors.  
u Create a command center for organizing federal, state, and local agencies, not-for-profits, 
and companies to build a system for supporting the seniors in their home. The ethos of the 
command center would be a military campaign with clear objectives, command power to cut 
through red tape and an open-ended funding stream. The primary method for ensuring that 
seniors comply should be through inducement and shaming.  
u Use a similar command structure to begin building the hospital supply, the beds, and 
ventilators that are required. Create a building target based on estimates that consider the 
kinds of calculations I develop in this working paper. If necessary, commandeer private 
businesses to meet these targets.  
u Build a system for developing and enforcing a standardized protocol for reducing and 
sustaining a requisite and minimum length of stay in non-ICU beds.  
u Protect the supply chain required to produce the infrastructure we need to help us care for 
the sick. Risk putting people in the field to make this happen.  
u Prepare a plan for price controls, as is done in war, should supply shortages emerge.  
u Plan forward for relaxing social distancing measures depending on the rate of spread of 
infections, best measured by the doubling days of deaths. The sooner we confirm its wide 
spread, declare an end to the practice and restart the economy. 
u Develop a plan for preventing the bankruptcy of small businesses. Rather than focus on 
loans, which only adds to future business expense, give small businesses contracts that 
commit all levels of government to buy these businesses’ products and services over the 
next year. Businesses can use these contracts to secure lines of credit with their banks.  
u For all initiatives focus at all the times on the bottlenecks. Don’t try to get everything right, 
just release the bottlenecks.  
 
This thrust of this proto-plan is partly a response to the constricted quality of the discourse to 
date about how to cope with the crisis. The epidemiologists have dominated the discussion to 
our great cost and injury. The public health perspective is essential, but we desperately need 
system thinkers, project managers, enterprise builders, corporate CEOs, economists, and 
engineers. The time for calibrating one more model is long past. As a systems-psychodynamic 
theorist, I am interested in understanding how it came to pass that a war against a plague 
became a public health story alone. One hypothesis is that the public health professionals have 
filled the vacuum because the command center—the President—has been too passive, reactive, 
and without the capacity to inspire and direct. But that is a conversation for another day.  
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My dearest reader: I have no influence in this world, beyond my limited personal and 
professional sphere. I wrote this working paper with a degree of urgency, as a way enacting the 
limited agency I have, which is my capacity to think, and put out good ideas into the ether. I 
also wrote this working paper as one way of coping with my own anxiety by imagining, 
fantasizing, that I could have some effect on the looming crisis. But if you feel similarly urgent 
and some or any of the ideas here resonate, I urge you to find your best way of “shouting it 
from the hilltop.” We need many more voices from many different disciplines to respond to the 
current crisis.  
